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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LYNDA MURIEL ECKOLS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

I

TI.

LELA HANCOCK ANDERSON,
GENE CALVIN 'VINCH and
CLAUDE C. WINCH,
Defendants-Respondents.

case N o.
12377

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action to recover for personal injuries
arising out of a motorcycle-automobile collision in Salt
Lake County.

DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT
At the conclusion of testimony on behalf of plaintiff, defendants \Vinch moved the Court for directed
1erdicts. The .Motion of Gene Calvin Winch was grant1

ed at that time but ruling was reserved upon the .Motion
of Claude C. 'Vinch. At the conclusion of all testimony,
the Motion of Claude C. Winch was granted.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the Order granting de.
fendants' .Motions for Directed Verdicts as made by the
Honorable Bryant II. Croft, District Judge, so as to
allow the matter to be presented on its merits before a
JUry.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 4, 1967, defendant Gene Calvin 'i\Tinch
requested of plaintiff that she accompany him on a
motorcycle ride (R. 308). At that time both plaintiff
and defendant Gene Calvin Winch were residing in a
trailer court on 40th West in Salt Lake County (R. 172
and 246) , and both were 16 years of age ( R. 241 and
306) . The motorcycle was brand new and had been purchased two days before the accident (R. 243). The mo·
torcycle was purchased in the name of defendant Claude
C. Winch (R. 244), and Claude C. Winch had given his
son, Gene Calvin Winch, permission to drive it (R.
244).
The weather was clear and dry (R. 181), and the
cyclists proceeded north from the trailer court on 40th
West (R. 308 and 309), a two-lane highway with one
lane north and one lane south (R. 181). At the inter·
2

1

t

ectiuu of 4lst South with 40th West, the motorcycle
came to a stop at a traffic signal ( R. 309) . At that point
a black car, proceeding in the same direction, pulled up
to the traffic signal to the left of the motorcycle (R.
2.13). After proceeding north beyond the stop light, the
black car was, at various times, behind the motorcycle
and was, at other times, in front of the motorcycle (R.
323). This maneuvering where there were different
Intervals of passing was described as "tic-tac-toe" (R.
323).
1

The accident scene was at 3925 South 40th West (R.
181). At that point the roadway was 38 feet wide (R.
181), and was surfaced with asphalt (R. 181). The
roadway there consisted of a two-lane highway, one lane
north and one lane south (R. 181 and 248).
Immediately prior to impact, the motorcyclist was
attempting to pass on the right of two vehicles ( R. 188,
205 and 310). In doing so the motorcycle wa!) traveling
between one and 21/2 feet left of the right hand side of
the road ( R. 259 and 266) . At a point of time when the
motorcycle was right by the back wheel of the black car
(R. 277), defendant Gene Calvin Winch saw the brake
lights of the Anderson vehicle (R. 262 and 277). The
tail lights of the Anderson vehicle were viewed by defendant Gene Calvin Winch by looking through the
windows of the black car (R. 261 and 277). After seeing the brake lights on the Anderson vehicle, defendant
Gene Calvin Winch did not immediately apply his
brakes (R. 263). Defendant Gene Calvin Winch proceeded "not very far" in that position before he saw that

3

the Anderson car had turned right and stopped (R.
277). Mr. Winch immediately slammed on his brakes
'
but nevertheless drove into the side of the Anderson
vehicle ( R. 277) .
Defendant Gene Calvin \Vinch first applied the
back brakes as hard as he could and then after the elapse
of reaction time applied the front brakes ( R. 222 and
266) . The motorcycle laid down a single skid mark of
IOI feet before impact (R. I84). (This motorcycle, as
all others, was constructed so that the front wheel would
not lock, thereby helping the driver maintain control (R.
2I8), and, in fact, producing a greater braking effect
than if the wheel were locked (R. 2I9) .) Under such
circumstances, the minimum speed of the motorcycle was
computed to be between 46 and 51 miles per hour (R.
227 and 228) . These figures did not include impact
speed, the advantage of impending skid, and brake lag
( R. 228) . The posted speed limit was 35 miles per hour
(R. 206).
The motorcycle and its occupants collided with the
right front and right rear doors of the Anderson vehicle
(R. 183). The point of impact was two feet-six inches
right of the right edge of the road ( R. 184) .
As a proximate cause of the accident (R. 168), the
plaintiff sustained a cut on her scalp, a burn on the back
right calf from the exhaust manifold, and a compound
fracture of the left leg with a laceration where the bone
had come through the midsection of the lower leg (R.
158). The shaft of the bone was displaced to the inward
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side and a third small fragment of bone had broken
away (R. 160 and 161). Plaintiff remained hospitalized
from March 4th to lVIarch 12th (R. 166). Subsequently,
on September 1, 1967, plaintiff's right leg was operated
on to remove dead tissue from the center portion of the
burn (R. 164). On November 6, 1967, the cast was removed, but since there was still motion in the fractured
site, a new cast was applied ( R. 166) . The cast was
finally removed on December 4, 1967, (R. 166). Approximately three weeks to one month after the cast was
removed the plaintiff was able to put weight on her left
leg (R. 320) . The plaintiff had headaches of decreasing
severity for about one year after the accident ( R. 318).
The plaintiff sustained no permanent disability ( R.
168), but was permanently scarred on both legs ( R.
169 and 319).

ARGUlHENT
POINT I.
\VHETHER DEFENDANT GENE CALVIN
WINCH WAS GUILTY OF WILLFUL :MISCONDUCT WHICH WAS THE PROXIMATE
CAUSE OF INJURY TO PLAINTIFF IS A
QUESTION OF FACT FOR DETERMINATION BY A JURY.
Section 41-6-56, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, lists
three exclusive conditions under which the driver of a
vehicle may pass upon the right of another vehicle pro5

ceeding in the same direction. That statute in its entirety reads as follows :
41-6-56 Passing upon right - When permissible
- (a) The driver of a vehicle may over take and
pass upon the right of another vehicle only under
the following conditions.
1. 'Vhen the vehicle overtaken is making or
about to make a left turn;
2. Upon a street or highway with unobstructed
pavement not occupied by parked vehicles of sufficient width for two or more lines of moving
vehicles in each direction;
3. Upon a one-way street, or upon any roadway on which traffic is restricted to one direction
of movement where the roadway is free from obstructions and of suf f'icient width for two or more
lines of moving vehicles.

(b) The driver of a vehicle may overtake and,
allowing sufficient clearance, pass another vehicle upon the right only under conditions permitting such movement in safety. In no event
shall such movement be made by driving off the
pavement or main-traveled portion of the roadway.
Passing to the right of an overtaken vehicle, whether prohibited by statute or otherwise, is generally recognized
negligence. This general rule is stated in 60 A
C. J. S., Motor Vehicles, Section 326 ( 4): "Accordingly,
an attempt to pass on the right of the overtaken vehicle
ordinarily is negligence or negligence per se."
In this case the black vehicle overtaken was proceeding straight ahead (R. 266 and 267), and the An-
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derson vehicle, with which collision was had,
making
a right turn ( R. 293). The road involved was a twolane highway with one lane north and one lane south (R.
181). Defendant Gene Calvin Winch testified that in
the regular cour.se of travel, 40th 'Vest Street contained
just one north-bound lane, but that he had seen cars
side by side on the north-bound line when they were
racing ( R. 293) .

Both the plaintiff ( R. 310) and the investigating
officer ( R. 188 and 205) testified that defendant Gene
Calvin \Vinch was attempting to pass on the right of
overtaken vehicles at the time of the accident. The investigating officer testified as to the conversation had
with Gene Calvin Winch during the course of the investigation (R. 188) :
Q. (Interposing) I am asking about Mr. Winch now.

A. Excuse me. Mr. 'Vinch said he was passing on the
right of the two vehicles and he didn't see the turn
signal on the front car, which is Mrs. Anderson's
car. He didn't see it until it was too late and when
he did see it he hit his brakes but it was too late to
avoid the collision.

Plaintiff not only testified that defendant Gene
Calvin Winch was passing on the right (R. 310), but
also testified that he was playing tic-tac-toe by passing
the black car at different intervals ( R. 323). The passing when the collision occurred was not the first passing
by defendant Gene Calvin Winch to the right of the
overtaken vehicle ( R. 321 and 323) .

7

The conduct of defendant was hardly consistent
with that required by the driver of a passing vehicle.
Because of the inherent dangers in passing, even on the
left, a high degree of care is required. The rule expressing this degree of care and tacitly recognizing the obligation to pass on the left is found in Maragakis v. United
States, 172 F. 2d 393, 395 (10th Cir. 1949) . That case
involved the application of Utah law to a driver attempting to pass on the left.

"The rule, whether statutory or decisional, which
requires the driver of a vehicle overtaking another proceeding in the same direction, to pass to
the left at a safe distance, imposes a high degree
of care, commensurate with the circumstances involved. (Citing authority) * * *"
The burden imposed upon a driver undertaking to
pass to the right is obviously greater than the burden
imposed upon a driver undertaking to pass to the left.
This is so because it is generally regarded as lawful to :
pass to the left while being generally regarded as un·
lawful to pass to the right. The duty thus being greater
than when merely attempting to pass to the left, the
breach of that duty must give rise to a higher degree of
culpability.
In assessing the culpability of Gene Calvin Winch,
it should be recognized that his misconduct was willful.
Gene Calvin 'Vinch was admittedly inexperienced on
such a motorcycle ( R. 243) , and had recognized the
danger in passing to the right on a two-lane highway
( R. 264) . The motorcycle was brand new and had been
driven by defendant only on two prior days (R. 243).
8

Although defendant denied passing the black car on
the right, he did acknowledge the danger in passing to
the right on a two-lane highway and the likelihood that
passing to the right could cause injury (R. 264-265).
During cross examination of Mr. Winch, his deposition
was re-read with the result that his prior conversation
was acknowledged (R. 264 and 265):
Q. And you didn't pass the black car on the right?

A. No.
Q. You wouldn't do that, would you normally, when

you are driving on a two-lane highway? You have
taken driver's training I take it?

A. Yes, sir. The only time I would ever do that is if we
was at a light and he was turning left and I was going to go straight.
Q. You do know then that it is a dangerous thing?

A. It is a dangerous thing to do on a two-lane highway.
Q. You know that it could cause danger or perhaps in-

jury to you or anybody that is riding with you if
you pass on the right?

A. Right.
Similar conduct has sustained holdings of gross
negligence. In Smiddy v. O'Neil, 277 Mass. 336, 177
N.E. 809 (1933), the defendant was requested by plaintiff to take her for a ride. The defendant in that case
engaged in zigzagging in and out before an accident
finally occurred. Ultimately the defendant attempted to
9

pass another automobile to the right of the overtaken
automobile, although there was room to pass on the left.
The defendant struck the overtaken vehicle. The Massa.
chusetts Supreme Court there held that such evidence, if
found to be true, would constitute gross negligence. Sim.
ilarly, in Kimbro v. Holladay, 154 So. 369 (La. Ct.
App. 1934) , the defendant overtook a school bus traveling in the same direction. The road was straight and the
bus was seen by the defendant while a considerable distance separated the two vehicles. The bus was traveling
near the center line of the road and pulled to the left for
purposes of turning into a narrow road. However, the I
bus being long and the bridge on the side road being ·
narrow, a wide turn was
The defendant
ceased feeding gas to his car, but did not apply his brakes
until he realized that he could not stop to prevent the
collision. At that point the defendant accelerated and
attempted to pass the bus on the right side. In holding
the defendant responsible to his passenger, the court
made the following statement on page 372:

"* * * Defendant, in attempting to pass the bus
from the right side, was grossly negligent. An
explanation of his action is that he thought the
bus had pulled over to the left of the road to un·
load passengers. Even though that had been true,
which was not, it was incumbent upon defendant
to have reduced his speed and have his car under
such control as to be able to stop at a very short
distance in case of emergency. It was
negligence for defendant to pass the bus on its
wrong side of the road and at such a speed as he
10

was traveling at the time, and his
the proximate cause of the accident.'

was

It should be noted that defendant Gene Calvin
Winch was similarly traveling at an excessive rate of
,peed. An accident reconstruction specialist testified to
facts from which a jury could have found defendant's
speed to be in excess of between 46 and 51 miles per
hour (R. 227 and 228). The posted speed limit was 35
miles per hour ( R. 206) . Although speed alone is not
sufficient to constitute willful misconduct, it is a factor
to be considered along with other conduct.
In Chapman v. Buder, 14 Mich. App. 13, 165 N.
W. 2d 436 (Mich. Ct. App., 1969), the trial court grant-

ed defendant's motion for a directed verdict. In reversing, the appellate court held that the jury could have
inferred from the evidence that immediately before the
time of the accident defendant was indulging in a display of driving prowess by dodging cars and other dangerous feats. In so holding the willful misconduct of defendant to be a jury question, the court made the following statement on page 439:
"'Vhether the driver of a motor vehicle has proceeded recklessly in the face of a traffic hazard
that is or should be apparent to him, with a wilful
and wanton disregard of the safety of a passenger, is, generally speaking, a question of fact for
determination by the trier of the facts. Obviously
involved is the state of mind of such driver, which
is necessarily a matter of inference from the facts
in each case."

11

POINT II.
UNDER UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953
SECTION 41-2-22, AN OWNER OF A MOTOR
VEHICLE KNOWINGLY PERMITTING A
MINOR UNDER THE AGE OF 18 YEARS TO
DRIVE SUCH VEHICLE UPON A HIGHWAY
IS LIABLE TO THE MINOR'S GUEST FOR
THE MINOR'S NEGLIGENCE.
)

The issue here presented was decided by the trial
judge by granting the motion of defendant Claude C.
Winch for a directed verdict. The trial judge recognized
the split of authority on the issue and noted that this
would be a good case for the rendition of guidance by
the Supreme Court (R. 393).
This issue involves the construction of two statutes.
One such statute, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section
41-2-22, establishes the liability of an owner of a motor
vehicle for entrusting that vehicle to a minor under the
age of 18 years to be driven upon a highway of the State
of Utah. The other statute, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
Section 41-9-1, commonly known as the "guest" statute,
relieves the liability of hosts to their guests for negligence, but not for intoxication or willful misconduct. As
applicable, these statutes are herein reproduced:
41-2-22 Owner liable for negligence of minor.

Every owner of a motor vehicle causing or know·
ingly permitting a minor under the age of
eighteen years to drive such vehicle upon a high·
way, and any person who gives or furnishes a

12

motor vehicle to such minor, shall be jointly and
severally liable with such minor for any damages
caused by the negligence of such minor in driving
such vehicle.

* * * *

41-9-1 Responsibility of owner or driver of a vehicle to guest. Any person who as a guest accepts
a ride in any vehicle, moving upon any of the public highways of the State of Utah, and while so
riding as such guest receives or sustains an injury, shall have no right of recovery against the
owner or driver or person responsible for the operation of such vehicle. * * * Nothing in this section shall be construed as relieving the owner or
driver or person responsible for the operation of
a vehicle from liability for injury to or death of
such guest proximately resulting from the intoxication or willful misconduct of such owner,
driver or person responsible for the operation of
such vehicle; provided, that in any action for
death or for injury or damage to person or property by or on behalf of a guest or the estate, heirs
or legal representatives of such guest, the burden
shall be upon plaintiff to establish that such intoxication or willful misconduct was the proximate cause of such death or injury or damage."

An analysis of these statutes should take into consideration their history and analagous section 41-2-10
(2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953. This latter section
establishes the liability of the person signing the driver's
license application of a minor under the age of 18 years
for any damages caused by the "negligence or willful
misconduct" of the minor. Section 41-2-10 (2) and Section 41-2-22 initally appeared in the Laws of 1933,
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Chapter 45, as Sections 22 and 23 respectively. At that
point, both sections referred to the liability of the owner
or applicant for the "negligence" of the minor, but both
omitted any reference to "willful misconduct." Section
41-2-10 (2) was repealed by Laws of 1935, Chapter 47,
Section 1, but was re-enacted with a significant change
by Section 9 of that same chapter. The re-enacted section, which later became designated as Section 41-2-10
( 2), expressly made the applicant liable for the "negligence or willful misconduct" of the minor. Section 41-222 has remained unchanged since its inception. Consequently, only Section 41-2-10 ( 2) expressly establishes
the liability of an applicant for the willful misconduct
of a minor under the age of 18 years. The question then
arises whether an owner, under Section 41-2-22, is liable
for the willful misconduct of a minor under the age of 18
years to whom he entrusts his vehicle. To hold that the
owner is not so liable, would be contrary to reason and
would surely create an unexpected result. Such an interpretation would mean that the owner was responsible
for ordinary negligence but not for the greater culp·
ability of willful misconduct.
A similar situation was presented to the Michigan
Supreme Court in Peyton v. Delnay, 348 l\'Iich. 238, 83

N.W. 2d 204 (1957). In that case an owner was made
liable for the "negligent operation of such motor vehicle''
when driven with express or implied consent by another.
The plaintiff in that case satisfactorily established the
gross negligence of the driver. The question then arose
whether the driver's father should be exonerated because

14

his daughter was guilty of gross negligence. The court
held the owner to be responsible for his daughter's gross
negligence, and in so doing made the following statement on page 209:

"* * * It would be a strange construction of such
statute to hold an owner for the ordinary negligence of the person whom he allowed to drive his
car and free him from liability if his chosen driver
was found guilty of gross negligence or wilful
and wanton misconduct."
A reasonable interpretation of our Section 41-2-22
would thus be to hold the owner responsible for the
minor's willful misconduct as in Section 41-2-10 (2),
where the reference to "willful misconduct" is express.
However, it must be assumed that the legislature intended some difference between these two sections by the
addition of the reference to "willful misconduct" to only
Section 41-2-10 (2). This becomes significant when the
statutes are applied in connection with the guest statute.
The sole reference to "negligence" and the omission of
reference to "willful misconduct" in Section 41-2-22 can
only be interpreted to mean that the legislature intended
the owner to be responsible for the negligent acts of
minors to whom he entrusted his automobile without the
necessity of showing willful misconduct.
In the case of Andrus v. Allred, 17 Utah 2d 106,

404 P. 2d 972 ( 1965) , it was stated by this court that

one of the fundamental rules of statutory construction
was a review of the intent and purpose of the statute.
Since that case was involved with the construction of the

15

Utah guest statute, the court's statement, as found on
page 109, is appropriate:
·
!

"Allowance should be made for the fact that
statutes are necessarily stated in general terms
and that often there is neither the prescience
foresee, nor sufficient flexibility of language to
cover with exactitude all of the exigencies of life
which may arise. For this reason one of the fundamental rules of statutory construction is that
the statute should be looked at as a whole and in
the light of the general purpose it was intended
to serve; and should be so interpreted and applied
as to accomplish that objective. In order to give
the statute the implementation which will fulfill
its purpose, reason and intention sometimes pre·
vail over technically applied literalness."
The Andrus case continues by stating (page 109)
that the purpose of our guest statute is "* * * to afford
some protection to a generous person who gives a ride
to another from being sued by the guest who accepts the
favor. * * *" Similarly, 60A C. J. S., Motor Vehicles,
Section 399.4 (a) gives the identical policy of such statutes together with another purpose:

"* * * The primary policy of such statutes is one
of social equity, to relieve from hardship one who
has acted generously in transporting another
without any compensation, that is, to limit the
right of recovery by those who had no moral right
to recompense, those carried for their own con·
venience for their own business or pleasure, and
those invited by the operator as a mere
gesture; and another purpose of such statutes is
to remedy the evil of a guest pressing claims for
personal injuries against the driver in which both
16

the guest and driver are guilty of collusion with
intent to defraud casualty companies. * * *"
An analysis of the policy reasons behind the guest
statute discloses that the policies will not be served by
, shielding the owner Claude C. Winch from liability. The
first policy is to protect a generous person who gives a
ride to another from being sued by his benefactor. In the
mstant case the plaintiff was given a ride by the driver
Gene Calvin 'i\Tinch; the owner Claude C. Winch did
not offer the ride to plaintiff or have knowledge concerning her being a passenger. This is not a matter of
the plaintiff turning upon her benefactor. The plaintiff
was not the guest of owner Claude C. 'i\Tinch; instead,
plaintiff was the guest of driver Gene Calvin Winch.
Liability is not here sought against Claude C. Winch
because of any host-guest relationship between he and
plaintiff; liability is sought against defendant Calude C.
Winch because of his carelessness in entrusting the motorcycle to one deemed incompetent because of his age.
The second stated purpose of the guest statute is to
remedy the evil of collusive lawsuits. Such a purpose is
legitimate where the facts suggest collusion as in lawsuits between husband and wife. However, collusion between two sixteen year olds is remote and collusion between one sixteen year old and the father of the other is
beyond belief.
Clearly the purposes of the guest statute would not
be followed if the guest statute was used to shield defendant Claude C. '1Vinch from liability.

17

On the other hand, the purpose of the owner Jia.
bility statute, Section 41-2-22, will be served by holding
defendant Claude C. Winch liable for the negligence of
his minor son. The purpose of Section 41-2-22 (fonnerly
Section 57-4-26 U. C. A. 1953) was given in the case of
Lowder v. Holley, 120 Utah 231, 233 P. 2d 350, 353
(1953).
"The obvious intent of the legislature was to protect innocent third parties from negligence of
minors to whom cars are furnished or who are
permitted by the owners of the cars to drive them,
by holding the owners responsible therefor. * **'
The purpose behind statutes establishing the liability of
owners of motor vehicles for the negligence of persons
to whom the motor vehicle is entrusted was similarly
expressed in 8 Am.J ur.2d, Automobiles and Highway
Traffic, Section 595:
"The purpose of such statutes is to place upon the
owner of a motor vehicle liability for injuries in
its operation by another with his permission, ex·
press or implied, and thus hold the owner answer·
able for his failure to place the instrumentality in
proper hands. * * *"

The purpose of such statutes is the protection of
third parties such as plaintiff from the negligence of ,
minors. This liability is placed upon the owner for his !
failure to place the instrumentality in proper hands. In
Utah the statute deems a minor under the age of 18
years to be incompetent in the handling of motor ve·
I
hicles. Any owner of a motor vehicle entrusting the same •
to such a minor is therefore answerable for his own fail·

18

...

ure to place the instrumentality in proper hands. This

policy cannot be effectuated where the owner is relieved
by the guest statute for this failure to properly entrust
the vehicle. Clearly, this statute will give the result intended only if defendant Claude C. Winch is held to
answer for that responsibility which he assumed by entrusting his minor son with the motorcycle.
The policies behind these statutes should dictate a
result favorable to plaintiff-particularly since there is
a split in the decisional law. This split of authority is
acknowledged by a review of cases and by Am. Jur. 2d,
Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Section 473, and
60A C. J. S., Motor V chicles, Section 399.3 (b). The
latter section states the rule favorable to this plaintiff
as follows:
"Under a statute providing that the owner or
other person permitting a minor of a certain age
to drive an automobile, or furnishing a vehicle to
him shall be jointly and severally liable with such
minor for damages caused by his negligence, a
parent may be held liable for the ordinary negligence of a minor driver to whom he entrusts his
automobile, and the terms of a f]'uest statute are
inapplicable to affect such liability. * * *" (Emphasis added)
The two leading cases on this issue would appear
to be McHugh v. Brown, 58 Del. 154, 125 A. 2d 583
(1956), and Bisoni v. Carlson, 171 Kan. 631, 237 P. 2d
404 (1951). In McHugh the owner was held to be relieved of liability by the guest statute; whereas, in Bisoni
the owner was held responsible notwithstanding the fact
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that his minor son was shielded by the guest statute. Iii
Bisoni the owner liability statute was identical with ilit
Utah statute except as to the age limit. The Kansai
guest statute was reported (page 406) to read as fol.
lows:
"That no person who is transported by the owner
or operator of a motor vehicle, as his guest, with.
out payment for such transportation, shall have a
cause of action for damages against such owner
or operator for injury, death or damage, unles1
such injury, death or damage shall have resulteo
from the gross and wanton negligence of the op·
erator of such motor vehicle."
In that case the court drew a distinction between the
operation of the motor vehicle and the entrustment of
the motor vehicle by the own_er to the minor. '!'hat case
explained that statutes of the kind extended the com·
mon law rule of liability of the owner and made the
owner liable for his own negligence in permitting his
minor son to operate the car on the highways. The stat·
ute extended the common law by deeming a minor under
the specified age to be incompetent in the handling of
motor vehicles. This point was stated by the Kansas
Supreme Court, on page 406, as follows:

"* * * The negligence of A. J. Carlson occurred
when he permitted his son Clayton to use the
on the highways, although the amount of his ha·
bility would be measured by the extent of the
damages resulting from the negligence of Clayton in driving the car. The statute as applied here
makes A. J. Carlson and Clayton 'jointly and
severally liable' for such damages. * * *"
20

.Furthermore, the Kansas Supreme Court gave considerable emphasis to the language of the owner liability
statute wherein it referred to "jointly and severally liable." The court there discussed the distinction between
jomt and several liability and cited several authorities in
reaching the following conclusion, as found on page 406:
"Here the tort was not jointly committed. A. J.
Carlson committed his wrong when he consented
to Clayton D. Carlson driving the car, and Clayton D. Carlson having committed his wrong later
when he was driving it. A. J. Carlson had previously made himself liable for any damages
caused by Clayton's negligence."
It should be noted that the Utah statute is identical in
this respect to the Kansas statute. The Utah statute

similarly refers to the owner and driver as being "jointly
and severally liable." Just as the Kansas Supreme Court
held, the word "severally" in the statute cannot be ignored.

The Kansas Supreme Court next looked to the
guest statute which contained reference to the "owner
or operator of the motor vehicle." That court held the
guest statute to be oriented towards the operation of
motor vehicles and not towards the entrustment of motor
rehicles. The "owner" was there held to be the one transporting a person who claims damages. Examples of
"owners" transporting the person claiming damages
would exist where the driver was an agent of the owner
or where the law of respondeat superior applied.
This reasoning has been applied under slightly diifert·nt terminology in several other cases. Brandon v.
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Roy, 259 Iowa 1271, 147 N.W. 2d 1810 (1967), and
Williams v. Husted, 54 N. E. 2d 165 (Ct. App. Ohio

1943), are such cases where the defendants sought to
shield themselves from liability by asserting guest stat.
utes. In both of those cases the plaintiffs sought to estah.
lish liability under the common law entrustment doc.
trine. In both of those cases the courts held that the ap.
plicable guest statutes did not shield the owners from
responsibility to a guest of the driver. In both of those
cases it was noted that the plaintiffs were guests of the
drivers, but did not have the same relationship with the
owners. In other words, the plaintiffs were the guests ol
the drivers, but the defendants were not hosts of the
plaintiffs. In Willi.ams, on page 168, the court expressed
its reasoning as follows:
"Aside from the question of the guest statute, we
must determine whether or not the grandmother
is responsible for the negligence of the grand·
daughter. It is our opinion that the guest statute
has no application to the facts as pleaded for the
reason that the plaintiff was not the guest of the
defendant."
Similarly, in Penton v. Favors, 262 Ala. 262, 78 So.
2d 278 (1955), and Chapman v. Buder, 14 Mich. App.
13, 165 N. W. 2d 436 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969), the de·
fendants asserted guest statutes as shields against lia·
bility to guests of the drivers. In Chapman it was assert·
ed that the defendant had entrusted his automobile to his
son who was incompetent to handle the vehicle because
of his age, and in Penton the defendant delivered the
automobile to the driver in a defective condition. Both
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of those cases held that the applicable guest statutes applied to the operation of motor vehicles and not to the
entrustment of the vehicles. In both of those cases the
owners were held to be responsible without a showing of
willful misconduct notwithstanding the
statutes.
In Penton v. Favors it is significant to note that the
guest statute referred, as does the Utah statute, to the
"owner, operator or person responsible for the operation of (a motor vehicle)." The Alabama Supreme
Court in a Per Curiam opinion, at page 284, gave the
following reason for its holding:
"It is true that our guest statute applies to the
"owner, operator or person responsible for the
operation of a motor vehicle." We think that
means to apply only to such person as may be
responsible for the manner of its operation; that
it does not apply to the owner unless he is operating the car in person or it is under his immediate
control or is operated by his servant or agent duly
authorized by him. When it is not so operated the
liability of the owner is governed by common law
principles." (Emphasis theirs)

The leading case of Bisoni v. Carlson, cited supra,
has been expressly followed by two subsequent cases. In
Ware v. State Farm lJ!lutual Automobile Ins. Co., 181
Kan. 291, 311 P. 2d 316 ( 1957), the Kansas Supreme
Court unanimously affirmed its prior decision in Bisoni.
In that case the parents of a deceased minor brought
action against the insurance company alleging fraud in
procuring a release. The defendant insurance company
was the insurer for the father of the minor driver. Plain·
tiff's deceased son was a guest of the driver in the car.
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The first question answered by the Kansas Supreml
Court was whether the plaintiff had a cause of actiol
against the defendants' assured, i.e., the father who en.
trusted the vehicle to his minor daughter. The court
there cited Bisoni as construing the owner liability stat
ute and summarily expressed the view that the plain.
tiffs had alleged a cause of action against the defena.
ant's assured.
In Garrison v. Williams, 442 S. W. 2d 231 (ArK.
1969), the defendant entrusted his automobile to hb

minor son. His minor son in turn entrusted the automo·
bile to his young friend, Baugher. Baugher took his girl
friend the plaintiff for a ride and subsequently lost con·
trol of the vehicle. The court discussed both common
law liability and liability under the Arkansas owner
liability statute. The Arkansas guest statute, which re·
ferred to the "owner or operator," was also discussed in
relationship to the owner liability statute. The Arkansa1
Supreme Court quoted extensively from Bisoni v. Carl·
son and expressly approved the decision in that case.

CONCLUSION
The conduct of defendant Gene Calvin Winch in
operating the motorcycle on which plaintiff was a
senger was such as to present a jury question on the
issue of willful misconduct. The plaintiff should not have
been deprived of her day in court by the intrusion of the
trial judge.
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But regardless of whether the driver was guilty of
ordinary negligence or willful misconduct, his father defendant Claude C. Winch should answer for his own
conduct in entrusting the motorcycle to a minor deemed
incompetent by reason of age to handle such an instrumentality. The purposes of applicable statutes will best
be served by resting liability upon the owner who knowingly permitted a minor under the age of 18 years to use
a motor vehicle upon a highway. The "guest" statute
should not be permitted to be thrown up by the owner as
a shield to defeat the claim of one not his guest.
Respectfully submitted,
WILFORD A. BEESLEY
ORVAL C. HARRISON
15 East 4th South

Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
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